


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PROSPECTS FOR INCREASED PROTECTION OF INTELLIGENCE,
SOURCES AND METHODS, THROUGH IMPLEMENTATION OF
DCID NO. 1/14, DATED 23 JUNE 1967

AS A RESULT OF THE BOARD'S STUDY OF THE SGT. DUNLAP CASE IN 1963, THE SECURITY COMMITTEE OF USIB WAS ASSIGNED THE TASK OF PREPARING AN APPROPRIATE DIRECTIVE. YOUR STUDY HIGHLIGHTED THE NEED FOR UNIFORMITY IN PERSONNEL SECURITY CRITERIA FOR ACCESS TO COMPARTMENTED INTELLIGENCE. THIS NEED WAS RE-EMPHASIZED WHEN, IN 1965, THE DISCOVERY WAS MADE OF THE ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES OF SGT. ROBERT L. JOHNSON DURING HIS ASSIGNMENT TO THE ARMED FORCES COURIER SERVICE (ARFCOS). AFTER CONSIDERABLE INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION BY THE SECURITY COMMITTEE, AS WELL AS CONSULTING WITH OTHER USIB COMMITTEES SUCH AS SIGINT AND COMOR, I ISSUED DCID NO. 1/14 23 JUNE 1967.

THE DCID ESTABLISHES A UNIFORM PERSONNEL SECURITY APPROVAL CRITERIA AS WELL AS THE INVESTIGATIVE REQUIREMENTS FOR ACCESS TO ALL THE COMMUNITY'S COMPARTMENTED COLLECTION SYSTEMS. THESE COMPARTMENTED SYSTEMS REPRESENT OUR MOST SENSITIVE, MOST PRODUCTIVE AND MOST EXPENSIVE

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COLLECTION EFFORTS. THE NUMBER OF PERSONS WITH THESE CLEARANCES WITHIN THE COMMUNITY IS STAGGERING. FOR EXAMPLE, AS OF DECEMBER 1966, THERE WERE APPROXIMATELY

25X1A [REDACTED] PERSONS WITH AN SI AND ABOUT [REDACTED] INDIVIDUALS

WITHIN THE COMMUNITY AND INDUSTRY WITH T-KH AND [REDACTED] 25X1A CLEARANCES.

THE IMPACT OF DCID 1/14 ON THE COMMUNITY ESTABLISHES, FOR THE FIRST TIME, COMMON PERSONNEL SECURITY CRITERIA AND UNIFORM INVESTIGATIVE REQUIREMENTS FOR ALL SYSTEMS. THE DIRECTIVE STRESSES THE POINT THAT A SECURITY APPROVAL MUST BE A COMMON SENSE DETERMINATION BASED UPON ALL AVAILABLE INFORMATION. CONSISTENT WITH THE "NEED-TO-KNOW" PRINCIPLE, A FURTHER ADVANTAGE UNDER THIS DIRECTIVE IS THAT A PERSON CLEARED FOR ONE SYSTEM CAN NOW BE READILY PROCESSED FOR ACCESS TO ANOTHER SYSTEM, SINCE THE STANDARDS ARE UNIFORM. ONE OF THE NET RESULTS WILL BE THE FACILITATION OF SECURITY CLEARANCE CERTIFICATIONS WITHIN THE COMMUNITY WITHOUT ANY SACRIFICE OF SECURITY STANDARDS. THE REQUIREMENT FOR A PERIODIC 5-YEAR RE-INVESTIGATION IS A VALUABLE CI ASSET AND IS IN DIRECT RESPONSE TO DEFICIENCIES HIGHLIGHTED BY THE SERIES OF PENETRATIONS OF U. S. INTELLIGENCE THAT HAVE OCCURRED OVER THE PAST FIVE YEARS. AS A SIDE EFFECT,

THE USIB APPROVED RECOMMENDATION THAT ALL PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO ARFCOS MEET DCID 1/14 STANDARDS WILL BOTH UPGRADE ARFCOS SECURITY AND AT THE SAME TIME PROVIDE GREATER SECURITY FOR THE COMMUNITY'S SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENTS CARRIED THROUGH ARFCOS CHANNELS.

WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF DCID 1/14, ESTABLISHED AS A PRECEDENT, THE PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE ARE SUCH THAT WE MAY EXPECT SOME PROGRESS TOWARD UNIFORMITY IN OTHER AREAS. IN THIS REGARD, AN INTER-AGENCY WORKING GROUP HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED TO EXPLORE THE FEASIBILITY OF DEVELOPING A UNIFORM PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT FOR THE COMMUNITY.

THIS TREND TOWARD UNIFORM SECURITY STANDARDS HAS BEEN EXTENDED TO THE PHYSICAL SECURITY FIELD, WITH THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE COMMON FORMAT FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY SURVEYS. AN ADDITIONAL WORKING GROUP HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED TO EXAMINE THE SECURITY PROCEDURES PERTINENT TO REVIEWING ARTICLES, SPEECHES AND PARTICIPATION IN SEMINARS TO INSURE SECURITY APPROVAL UNIFORMITY AMONG THE COMMUNITY AGENCIES. THE POSSIBILITIES FOR EVEN GREATER PROGRESS WITHIN THE COMMUNITY EXIST BUT ARE DEPENDENT

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UPON OTHER FACTORS WHICH MUST BE CONSIDERED IN THE
LIGHT OF RECENT CONGRESSIONAL EMPHASIS ON THE USE OF
THE POLYGRAPH AND TECHNICAL INVESTIGATIVE AIDS AS AN
INVASION OF PRIVACY.

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